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 How We Know Our Senses 
Eva Schmidt 
I propose a new criterion by which, I hold, subjects recognize and distinguish their sensory 
modalities. I argue that, rather than appealing to one of the standard criteria (sense organ, 
proximal stimulus, phenomenal character, or representational content (Grice 1962, 
Macpherson 2011a)) or to O’Dea’s (2011) proprioceptive content, we need to introduce the 
criterion of location in the functional architecture of the subject’s personal-level mind in 
order to make sense of an ordinary subject’s ability to tell immediately which sensory 
modalities are employed in her occurrent perceptual experience. More specifically, a 
subject’s personal-level mind is functionally organized into different faculties, and, seeing as 
it is her mind, she has a natural cognitive access to this structure; in the specific case of 
perceptual experience, perceptual input from the world is present to the subject as organized 
into the different sensory modalities, vision, hearing, touch, taste, and smell. I motivate and 
explicate my new criterion for distinguishing the senses, in particular its psychological 
aspects. Moreover, I show how it can handle problems raised by empirical findings, such as 
additional human senses (e.g. the vomeronasal sense) and cross-modal experiences (e.g. the 
experience of a speaker's voice emanating from his mouth). 
1. How to Distinguish the Senses: The Traditional Criteria 
In their investigations, philosophers of perception tend to focus on visual perceptual 
experience. By comparison, the non-visual sensory modalities (hearing, touch, taste, and 
smell) are usually, albeit undeservedly, neglected. One important question concerning the 
senses that has recently attracted more attention is the question of how to individuate the 
senses. Locus classicus of the corresponding debate is Grice’s (1962) paper ‘Some Remarks 
about the Senses’, where he discusses the following four criteria by which our sensory 
modalities may be distinguished.1 
(A) The sense organ that is involved in a particular sensory modality. 
(B) The proximal stimuli relevant to the sensory modality. 
(C) The specific phenomenal character associated with the sense. 
(D) The properties typically represented by the sense. 
For hearing, for instance, the criteria in question would be (A) the ear, plus the nerves and 
brain areas involved in processing input coming from the ear, (B) sound waves, (C) a 
particular auditory phenomenal character, and (D) sounds and their properties. 
In what follows, I will focus on one specific version of the individuation question and argue 
that it cannot be answered satisfactorily by appeal to any of these criteria. The question I want 
to focus on is: How can (and do) normal perceivers individuate their sensory modalities in the 
act of perceiving? For instance, how can Gertrude know that she sees the roundness of the 
coin, rather than feeling it? This is an epistemological question (concerned with our self-
knowledge of our sensory modalities). Note that this kind of knowledge seems so natural that 
it is (at least initially, see below) difficult to think of a scenario in which a subject might be 
wrong or unjustified in her beliefs about the sensory modality of her occurrent perceptual 
                                                        
1 Another very helpful discussion of these criteria can be found in Macpherson (2011). 
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experiences. In this respect, it is similar to a subject’s knowledge of the phenomenal character 
of her experiences – it is hard to come up with an example in which a subject is mistaken in 
her beliefs about the phenomenal character of one of her experiences.2 
A very closely related psychological question will also become relevant in what follows. This is 
the question of how ordinary perceivers are able to form their immediate introspective 
judgments about the sensory modalities of their occurrent perceptual experiences. It is a 
question concerning the mechanism by which perceivers can form such introspective 
statements, which is neutral on the epistemological issue of whether these judgments 
constitute knowledge. 
I will leave to one side a further question in the vicinity, viz. the question of the criteria by 
which scientists should best distinguish the different senses. I will not make claims about how 
scientists might best taxonomize sensory modalities. This kind of project is quite different 
from the one I will pursue here. It is not primarily concerned with a perceiver’s self-
knowledge or her immediate introspective judgments concerning her occurrent perceptual 
experiences. It plausibly has to take into account additional human senses (such as 
equilibrioception) and senses of other animals (such as bat echolocation).3  
Here is why the aforementioned criteria cannot provide an answer to my question. (A) cannot 
work because of counterexamples such as the following: When cold water enters my ear, I 
perceive that the water is cold. The simple sense organ criterion would wrongly classify this as 
an auditory experience of hearing the cold. Ordinary perceivers do not make this mistake – 
they know that they are detecting something cold with their sense of touch. On the other 
hand, it is futile to appeal to the nerves and brain areas relevant to processing information 
coming in through the ear, for the self-knowledge of normal subjects about their sensory 
modalities is clearly independent of their knowledge of nerves and brains.  
The same is true for criterion (B). Gertrude will be able to know that she feels rather than sees 
the roundness of the coin even if she is ignorant of the fact that, say, light waves are the 
proximal stimuli relevant to her sense of vision.  
The phenomenal criterion (C), on the other hand, is quite promising as far as its accessibility 
to ordinary perceivers is concerned. One might suggest that Gertrude knows that her 
experience of the roundness of the coin is a tactile experience because of its tactile 
phenomenal character, which she simply could not confuse with any other phenomenal 
character. However, the problem with this option is that this supposed modality-specific 
phenomenal character is hard, if not impossible, to pin down. 
The following objection is due to Grice (1962). If we try to explicate the phenomenal 
difference between Gertrude’s visual experience and her tactile experience of the roundness of 
the coin, we end up describing a difference in the external objects and their properties that 
Gertrude’s experiences present her with. For instance, we might end up saying that Gertrude 
sees the colour and shininess of the coin, but she feels its warmth and heaviness. This is a 
kind of transparency argument: All that seems to be left of the difference in phenomenal 
character between a visual and a tactile experience of the coin is a representational difference, 
which takes us to criterion (D), the representational criterion. 
It seems plausible enough that, between two different sensory modalities, there is always a 
difference with respect to the total properties represented by them. In the coin example, 
colour is represented by sight, but not by touch; on the other hand, warmth is represented by 
touch, but not by sight. Yet, focussing on my question concerning a normal perceiver’s 
knowledge of her sensory modalities, it seems wrong to say that she has to go through the list 
                                                        
2 I will address potential examples of mis-individuation of perceptual experiences in the objections section. 
3 The point of the traditional four criteria is (mainly) to provide an account of what makes a certain sensory 
modality the sensory modality it is – they fit best with a metaphysical project of individuating the senses. 
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of properties represented by a specific perceptual experience before she can determine which 
kind of sensory experience she is undergoing. Quite the contrary, a subject’s awareness of 
which sense she is employing in perceiving certain external properties seems to be more basic 
than her awareness of all the different kinds of properties she is perceiving in that sensory 
modality. 
To put it somewhat differently, according to the representational criterion, it looks as though 
a perceiver has to infer which sensory modality she employs in undergoing a perceptual 
experience from her knowledge of what properties out there she perceives. Such an account 
cannot do justice to the immediacy and non-inferentiality of a perceiver’s knowledge of the 
sensory modalities of her occurrent perceptual experiences. 
These four criteria, then, are unsatisfactory. Another, more promising criterion has been 
proposed by O’Dea (2011). Perceivers know the sensory modalities of their occurrent 
perceptual experiences because each sense represents itself, as a body part to be used to 
explore the environment, along with features of the environment. O’Dea claims that subjects 
know which sense they are employing because perceiving is partly proprioceptive, i.e., a 
perceptual experience represents not merely external objects and properties, but also which 
sense organ is used in undergoing the experience. In particular, each sense represents itself as 
a tool to explore the environment. 
One way to put his proprioceptive criterion is to say that perceivers know which sensory 
modality they are employing via 
(E) The sense organ proprioceptively represented by the perceptual experience. 
This view faces at least three problems. The first is that it is simply implausible that a 
perceptual experience represents not only things out in the subject’s environment, but also, 
on a par with this, that a certain sense organ is being used. When Gertrude sees the coin, she 
does not also see that she is seeing the coin.  
The second problem is a consequence of the assumption that the sensory modality is 
represented on a par with features of the environment: Perceptual misrepresentation of 
environmental features is widespread, so we should expect that there is also widespread 
misrepresentation of the sensory modality employed. But not so – as I mentioned before, it is 
hard to come up with examples of subjects’ mistaken judgments of the sensory modalities of 
their occurrent perceptual experiences. This is to say that, on O’Dea’s proprioceptive 
proposal, this kind of misrepresentation is a very rare occurrence. 
The third problem is that perceivers have immediate knowledge of which sensory modalities 
they are employing. They do not have to figure out which sense they are using in a perceptual 
experience by first sorting through their perceptual contents to find out which sensory 
modality is represented proprioceptively. For instance, Gertrude knows that she sees the coin 
(rather than feeling it) immediately, without first having to sift through the content of her 
visual experience, all the while trying to figure out whether there is a proprioceptive 
representation of her eye (rather than her skin) included in it. 
2. My Proposal 
First off, let me provide a brief diagnosis of why individuation criteria (A) – (E), that have 
been proposed to provide an account of how ordinary perceivers can individuate their sensory 
modalities in the act of perceiving, have failed. Their problem is that they cannot respect the 
following features of our judgments about our sensory modalities: 
(1) These judgments are immediate. 
(2) These judgments are non-inferential. 
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(3) These judgments are (or at least appear to be, intuitively) incorrigible. 
A better individuation criterion should respect these features of our judgments about the 
sensory modalities of our occurrent perceptual experiences. In this section, I will propose a 
new individuation criterion and argue that it can do justice to the aforementioned features of 
our judgments about our sensory modalities. 
Here is my proposal. A perceiver can tell that she has a perceptual experience in a certain 
sensory modality because, in undergoing a certain perceptual experience, it is not just the 
perceptual content that is immediately available to her, but also the perceptual state 
(including its sensory modality) whose content it is. We might say that perceptual experience 
is a package deal: The personal-level availability of a certain perceptual content goes along 
with the availability of the perceptual state (be it a visual, a tactile, an auditory, a gustatory, or 
an olfactory state) that it is a content of. 
Her perceptual states, including their sensory modality, are accessible to the perceiver as part 
of her overall access to the functional organization of her personal-level mind. To the subject, 
mental content is present as structured into different faculties, e.g. the perceptual faculties (or 
‘channels’). Functionally speaking, the senses are the mental faculties that convey different 
kinds of information about the subject’s immediate environment with the purpose of action 
guidance and belief formation. Cognitively to access a certain perceptual content via a 
particular sensory channel is cognitively to access the functionally individuated sensory 
channel through which the perceptual content enters the personal-level mind. So, on my 
proposal, the subject knows the sensory modalities of her occurrent perceptual experiences 
thanks to  
(F) The availability, to her, of the perceptual content’s ‘perceptual channel’ in the 
personal-level functional architecture of her mind. 
To put this in terms of the example of feeling vs. seeing the roundness of a coin, Gertrude 
knows that she sees the roundness of the coin (rather than feeling it) because this visual 
content is available to her as the content of a visual experience, not of a tactile experience. 
The visual experience is present to her in terms of her visual faculty’s particular functional 
significance in the overall functional architecture of her personal-level mind.  
Note that my claim is not that this access to a perceptual state in terms of its functional 
significance translates to the perceiver’s awareness of a certain kind of phenomenal character 
attached to the perceptual experience that is characteristic of the sensory modality in 
question. My claim is that subjects have an immediate access to how their minds are 
organized (at the personal level, of course), and to the channels through which mental 
content enters their personal-level minds. I hold that this is a kind of access that is not even 
mediated by a phenomenal character. 
To return to the example, Gertrude knows that she is seeing rather than feeling the roundness 
of the coin not because of elements of the content of her visual experience, nor because of its 
specific phenomenal character, but because she has direct access to the functional 
organization of her personal-level mind. She has access to the fact that the information about 
the coin is coming in through the visual channel rather than the tactile channel. 
The more general question in the vicinity is how a subject can ever tell that she believes 
something rather than desiring it, that she imagines something rather than remembering it, 
or that she perceives something rather than entertaining it as a thought. My suggestion is 
that, as a matter of functional structure, the personal-level mind is organized into different 
faculties, such as memory, belief, or perception. Perception, in its turn, is organized into the 
different perceptual channels of sight, hearing, touch, smell, and taste.  
This structure echoes the functional structure of the sub-personal mind, where, for instance, 
it is organized into the respective perceptual systems. The subject has direct cognitive access 
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to the personal-level functional structure – this should come as no surprise, since it is her 
own mind. This, I want to suggest, is how she can tell that she is not remembering that the 
coin is round, nor wishing that the coin were round, nor imagining that it is round, but that 
she is perceiving, via her sense of vision, that the coin is round. To do so, she does not have to 
take any detours, for instance through a phenomenal character or through a content 
representing the sensory modality. She has simply cognitively to access the functional 
organization, and in particular the sensory channel through which a certain perceptual 
content enters her personal-level mind.  
Let me add one clarificatory note. One may wonder whether the subject, in order to grasp the 
sensory modality of a particular perceptual experience, has to possess concepts pertaining to 
the functional role of states in that sensory modality. The idea would be that in order to gain 
knowledge of the sense modality of a certain perceptual experience, the subject has to exercise 
her concepts concerning the functional significance of the sense in question (e.g. that it is a 
sensory modality that deals with distal stimuli at a distance, that it takes light waves as its 
input, that it typically leads to this or that kind of belief, that it involves processing in the 
visual input module, etc.).  
Let me emphasize that this is not the view that I am advocating. It would lead us back to the 
criteria that I have criticized above. Rather, my view is that the personal-level mind has a 
certain functional organization, and that this organization presents itself to the subject just as 
naturally as the mental content that enters the mind through the described perceptual 
‘channels’. To the ordinary subject, perceptual content simply comes organized into the 
different sensory modalities.4 
My proposal is motivated, first, by the fact that none of the other criteria provides a 
satisfactory account of perceivers’ self-knowledge of the sensory modalities of their occurrent 
perceptual experiences.  
Second, my proposal does justice to the features of our judgments concerning our sensory 
modalities enumerated above. On my view, it is unproblematic to admit that our judgments of 
the sensory modalities of our occurrent perceptual experiences are immediate, non-
inferential, and incorrigible. Our knowledge of our sensory modalities is immediate, for it is 
part of our direct introspective accessibility of the functional organization of our own minds. 
It is non-inferential because, on my account, we do not infer to judgments about our sensory 
modalities from, e.g., the phenomenal character or aspects of the content of our perceptual 
experiences. It is (possibly, problems for this see below) incorrigible because our direct 
awareness of the functional structure of our own personal-level minds does not leave a lot of 
room for error. 
As a third point in favour, I might add that this kind of immediate access to the functional 
organization of one’s personal-level mind, and thereby to the mental states that bear certain 
contents, makes sense from an evolutionary perspective as well. To see this, imagine the 
perceiver being confused over whether she remembers seeing a tiger in front of her, or 
whether she is currently seeing a tiger in front of her. 
My account has both psychological and epistemological dimensions. The psychological 
dimension is that there actually is a functional organization of our personal-level minds as 
described, to which we have direct cognitive access, and from which our confidence in our 
knowledge of our sensory modalities is derived. The epistemological dimension concerns the 
question of whether this access constitutes knowledge to match this confidence. In what 
follows, I will mostly focus on the psychological issue. 
                                                        
4 But which concepts does the subject employ in judging that she is undergoing an experience in this or that 
sensory modality? I am not sure as to the best answer to this question, but generally speaking, the options that are 
open to me here are similar to the ones exploited by defenders of phenomenal concepts in the qualia debate. For 
instance, our concepts of our own sensory modalities might plausibly be recognitional or demonstrative concepts. 
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3. Objections 
I will discuss two problems for my account that result from recent research in cognitive 
science. The first problem is raised by senses that ordinary perceivers have, but know nothing 
about, such as the vomeronasal sense or equilibrioception. I claim that we can know our 
senses via our immediate cognitive access to the functional structure of our minds. How does 
this fit with scientists finding senses in humans that we know nothing about introspectively? 
One clear example of this is the vomeronasal sense. In the human nose, there is a sense organ 
that detects pheromones and thereby helps control sexual behaviour. We have no immediate 
cognitive access to this sense – we are not conscious of the fact that our sexual behaviour is 
influenced by a pheromone detector in the nose, nor can we become aware of this fact by 
merely introspecting our sensory modalities. It seems, then, that the vomeronasal sense is a 
counterexample to my claim that we have direct cognitive access to our perceptual modalities. 
Reply: I concede that not every channel through which we gather information about the 
environment registers as a distinct personal-level perceptual channel. In the case of the 
vomeronasal sense, we often just find ourselves being attracted to certain people, without 
being able to notice that there is something like a sensory modality involved informing us that 
someone is sexually attractive.  
Take a different case, equilibrioception. Our sense of balance is a sense that we take note of 
only when we lose our balance, for instance by spinning until we get dizzy. Otherwise, this 
sensory modality does not seem to register as an independent personal-level sensory channel. 
Again, I concede that this is a plausible example of a sensory modality that does not make 
itself known as a distinct sensory channel in the functional architecture of our personal-level 
minds.  
It is not problematic for me to admit this, for I am not in the business of making metaphysical 
claims about what makes something a particular sensory modality. Rather, I am in the 
business of explaining how we make our everyday judgments about the sensory modalities of 
our occurrent perceptual experiences (a psychological question), and of how we can have the 
corresponding everyday knowledge of our sensory modalities (an epistemological question). 
For these projects, there is no threat if there are other candidates for sensory modalities that 
we have no immediate introspective knowledge of. The most I am committed to, seeing as I 
am trying to argue that we can have immediate knowledge of our senses, is that the senses 
that we can cognitively access as personal-level sensory channels generally are as they appear. 
I hold that we are the authorities with respect to those sensory modalities that we can become 
aware of immediately (as I have proposed).  
The second problem is that my proposal may seem to be threatened by the possibility of 
cross-modal experiences. For instance, scientific findings suggest that we perceptually 
experience voices as coming from the moving mouths of speakers because of a combined use 
of hearing and vision. This is why ventriloquists can apparently ‘throw’ their voices and why it 
is confusing to watch a movie in which the timing of the movements the speakers’ mouths 
does not match their voices.  
These findings apparently constitute counterexamples to my claim that there is a distinct 
personal-level channel for each of our sensory modalities, a channel about which we can form 
immediate and incorrigible introspective judgments. It appears that we are regularly 
mistaken about which sensory channel is relevant to a certain perceptual experience, for we 
would classify hearing a speaker’s voice as an auditory experience, not as a cross-modal 
experience involving vision. 
There are other cases in the same vein. The spicy flavour of chilies is detected, in part, by pain 
receptors on the tongue. Plausibly, we cannot tell this by introspectively accessing our 
experience, for tasting chilies appears to be an exclusively gustatory experience. Similarly, the 
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rich flavour of a tomato sauce appears to be a matter merely of our sense of taste, when in 
reality, it is partly due to sensors in the nose and thus partly based on our sense of smell. 
Reply: Cases in which we do not notice the arguable cross-modality of our sensory 
experiences lead us back to the question of what individuates a perceiver’s sensory modalities, 
metaphysically speaking. One option is to take the hard line with respect to this question and 
insist that what makes a perceptual experience the kind of perceptual experience it is is how it 
strikes me: I am the authority on the sensory modality of my occurrent perceptual 
experiences. If an experience of a speaker’s voice strikes me as an auditory experience, then 
that’s what it is.  
My opponent’s claim is that my experience of a speaker’s voice must be cross-modal since it 
involves both my ears and my eyes and the physiological and nervous systems processing the 
input from ears and eyes, and since the proximal stimuli relevant to both vision and hearing 
are involved in this experience. But this reasoning presupposes that sense organ and proximal 
stimulus are relevant to the individuation of our senses, a claim I have rejected above. Given 
this, I can insist that the subject is the ultimate authority on her own sensory modalities, so 
that her senses must be individuated according to her judgments. 
The other option is to take a softer line and to concede that sensory modalities are the sensory 
modalities they are in virtue of sense organ, proximal stimulus, and relevant physiological 
and neural structures. Consequently, the subject’s judgment that she has an exclusively 
auditory experience is only apparently incorrigible. Even though it seems unconceivable to 
the uninformed perceiver that she could be mistaken in her judgments about her sensory 
modalities, cognitive science shows that subjects are prone to error in such judgments. For 
they fail to recognize the cross-modality of some of their perceptual experiences. 
But even this result would not be problematic for the psychological side of my proposal: For 
one, we do sometimes notice when an experience is cross-modal. For instance, eating a spicy 
chili involves not just a gustatory experience of spiciness; it is also a painful experience. For 
another, the (arguable) fact that our judgments of our sensory modalities are not always 
reliable is compatible with my psychological claim that we form immediate judgments 
regarding our sensory modalities based on our introspective access to the functional 
organization of our personal-level minds. For it is possible that this access is not perfect. 
Alternatively, it is possible that not everything that goes on in our minds at sub-personal 
levels is perfectly reflected in the functional make-up of our personal-level minds.  
To sum up this section, I have discussed two problems for my proposal raised by, first, 
sensory modalities that we have no immediate introspective knowledge of, and second, cross-
modal perceptual experiences. Both of these phenomena are initially problematic for my view 
because, according to it, we have immediate and incorrigible access to the sensory modalities 
of our occurrent perceptual experiences in functional terms.  
As to point one, I have conceded that there may be sensory modalities that we have no 
introspective access to, but argued that this is no problem for my view. With respect to the 
second problem, I have suggested a hard line one might take: The subject alone is the 
authority on her sensory modalities, so that supposedly cross-modal experiences turn out to 
be experiences in only one modality if this is how things strike the perceiver. But I have also 
described a soft line, according to which our judgments of the sense modalities of our 
occurrent perceptual experiences are only apparently incorrigible. Really, these judgments 
are sometimes mistaken, in particular in the case of cross-modal experiences.  
I have to admit that I am undecided which of the two lines to take. On the one hand, it is 
preferable not to devise views in the philosophy of mind that conflict with findings in 
cognitive science – this consideration clearly favours the soft line. On the other hand, the soft 
line casts doubt on our self-knowledge of the sensory modalities of our occurrent perceptual 
experiences. The problem lies not so much in my proposal of how we can individuate our 
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senses, but rather in a conflict between the intuitive view that we can have immediate, 
incorrigible knowledge of our senses and recent findings of cognitive science. 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, I have tried to find an answer to the question of how ordinary subjects can 
know about the sensory modalities of their own occurrent perceptual experiences. I have 
argued against four classical individuation criteria, viz. sense organ, proximal stimulus, 
phenomenal character, and representational content, and against one recent one, viz. 
proprioceptive representational content. Further, I have identified three intuitive features of 
our judgments of the sensory modalities of our perceptual experiences: their immediacy, non-
inferentiality, and their incorrigibility.  
My own proposal, which can respect these features, is that subjects have immediate 
introspective access to the functional organization of their personal-level minds, including the 
perceptual channels through which certain aspects of their environments are presented to 
them.  
I have discussed two problems for the claim that we can form immediate and incorrigible 
judgments concerning our sensory modalities (introspectively inaccessible sensory modalities 
and cross-modal experiences). I conceded that the latter problem indeed casts doubt on the 
(intuitively plausible) incorrigibility of our immediate judgments about our senses. This is not 
a problem for my psychological claim about the mechanism which enables us to form 
judgments about the sense modalities of our occurrent experiences. But it is a problem for the 
plausible related epistemological claim that we have privileged access to (and incorrigible 
self-knowledge of) the functional organization of our personal-level minds, including the 
perceptual channels through which perceptual content enters our minds.  
This could be taken as a starting point for further very interesting epistemological questions 
as to how we can know our senses, on my proposal: Are the proposed personal-level 
perceptual channels a direct reflection of the sub-personal functional organization of our 
minds? Or are they somewhat analogous to the user interface of a computer, which at best 
corresponds very vaguely to its actual functional makeup? Unfortunately, I will have to leave 
a discussion of these questions for another occasion. 
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